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ABSTRACT 
One of the most persistent beliefs about hypnosis is its ability to transcend mnemonic 
abilities. This belief has paved the way to the use of hypnosis in the clinical and legal 
arenas. The authors review the phenomena of hypnotic hypermnesia, pseudo-memories, 
and amnesia in light of current knowledge of hypnosis and memory.  The investigation of 
the relation between hypnosis and memory processes has played an important role in our 
understanding of memory in action.  Hypnosis provides a fertile field to explore the social, 
neuropsychological, and cognitive variables at play when individuals are asked to 
remember or to forget their past. We suggest promising avenues of research that may 
further our knowledge of the building blocks of memories and the mechanisms that leads to 
forgetfulness.   
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Preface 
Memory has been the object of scientific investigation for more than a century. It might 
come as a surprise to readers, including memory researchers, to discover that some of what we 
know today about memory, and the way we currently conceptualize it, is the byproduct of 
attempts to understand the effect of hypnosis on memory.  In this article we will focus on two 
major areas where hypnosis has kindled new and exciting developments for memory 
researchers.  The first is the area of false memory, where hypnosis has played a leading role in 
alerting researchers to (a) the possibility of creating false memories in the laboratory, (b) the 
unwarranted confidence hypnotized individuals place in the accuracy of their recall, and (c) 
clinical and forensic consequences associated with the instantiation of false beliefs. We next 
examine how hypnosis can be used to better understand autobiographical memories via analogs 
of functional amnesia, aberrations and alterations in self-identity, and psychological disorders. 
Finally, we will explore a number of research venues that promise to enrich our understanding 
of human memory. 
One of the most longstanding beliefs about hypnosis is that a hypnotized individual is 
able to remember much more than a non-hypnotized person (Johnson and Hauck, 1999; Legault 
and Laurence, 2007; Ost, Wright, Easton, Hope, and French, 2013).  The roots of this belief can 
be traced back to the practitioners of Animal Magnetism in the early 1800s, and most notably 
the Marquis de Puységur, who reported that his somnambulistic patients could recapture past 
events in minute detail, which they promptly forgot when “demagnetized.” None of the 
remembered events seemed available in the patients’ normal state. Hypermnesia (improved net 
recall over repeated trials), amnesia, and the belief that hypnosis is capable of uncovering or 
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revealing memories were to become intrinsically linked to the history of hypnosis, memory, 
and psychological experimentation for the next two hundred years (Laurence and Perry, 1988). 
At the end of the 19th century, hypnosis found itself at the heart of experimental 
psychology.  Luminaries in the nascent field of psychology, including William James, Wilhelm 
Wundt, Théodule Ribot, and Pierre Janet, to name a few, at one time or another, dabbled in 
hypnosis.  What caught their attention were the amazing memory feats that hypnotized 
individuals seemed to perform and the various forms of suggested amnesias that they 
displayed--what Ribot (1882) labelled the “exaltations of memory.” It was during this period of 
hypnotic effervescence that the observations of patients’ hypnotic abilities led to theories about 
dissociation, multiple personalities, unconscious cognitions, and emotions. Hypnotic 
hypermnesia, post-hypnotic amnesia, and posthypnotic suggestion were at the vital center of 
the new psychology of the mind.   
Nevertheless, what some patients were remembering or apparently forgetting raised 
questions and doubts in the minds of some hypnosis experimenters (e.g., Bernheim, 
1891/1973).  What if the traumatic memories recalled during hypnosis were in fact the product 
of suggestion?  What if the remembrances were false memories? This latter question wended its 
way through the experimental literature and eventually to the courts of law where the debate 
thrust the ones who believed in the power of hypnosis to exhume seemingly forgotten 
memories in opposition to those who favored the idea that suggestions, beliefs, and 
expectancies shaped the narratives that the patients reported as memories (see Laurence and 
Perry, 1988). Sounds familiar?  Indeed it does.   
If the beginning of the 20th century saw the interest in clinical and experimental hypnosis 
wane, beliefs surrounding its purported memory powers did not. Hypnosis continued to be used 
in therapy to explore the past, and techniques such as hypnotic age regression stirred interest 
and provoked speculation and theory-building attempts in the clinical context (Reiff and 
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Scheerer, 1960).  Ironically, what had unfolded as one of the most intense professional debates 
among psychologists at the end of the 19th century in Europe resurfaced at the end of the 20th 
century in America, again fuelled by beliefs surrounding the power of hypnosis on memory.  
 The trigger for the more recent debate was the enthusiasm of police forces for a ‘new’ 
investigative technique, forensic hypnosis, in the wake of which witnesses and victims of 
crimes were hypnotized to access crucial, yet consciously unavailable, information. 
Researchers soon challenged the extravagant claims of success touted by the hypno-
investigators or Svengali squads as they were called, based on suspicions that the alleged 
success of hypnosis was a chimera, nothing more than the product of undue suggestion. As in 
the 19th century, the matter became more muddled and complex with the renewal of interest in 
multiple personality disorder and the belief that not only was hypnosis allowing unconscious 
memories to surface, but that the recovered memories were often embedded in different 
“personalities” altogether.  Whereas the police use of hypnosis raised the question of whether 
suggestion leads to incorporating misinformation, the narratives of multiple personality patients 
raised the specter that suggestion could create completely new (and false) memories and 
crystallize imagined or fabricated self-identities. 
The importance of beliefs in shaping memory narratives 
We owe in part to hypnosis the realization that beliefs shape memory reports (see 
Mazzoni and Kirsch, 2002; Mazzoni, Scoboria and Harvey, 2010). Accordingly, what people 
remember when hypnotized depends, in part, on their beliefs about the effect of hypnosis on 
memory.  One popular belief is that when participants recall events during hypnosis, they recall 
more detailed and accurate memories compared with recall of the same events without 
hypnosis. This belief can probably be traced to the clinical work of Janet (1889/1973) who was 
one of the first therapists to use hypnosis to both help patients recover memories of traumatic 
events, which he assumed caused their pathological conditions, and to modify their memories 
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for these adverse events (see for example the well known case, “Marie” (Laurence and Perry, 
1988, p.236-237). Rooted in the work of early practitioners, like Janet, the belief that hypnosis 
can recover buried memories of traumatic events came to permeate many therapeutic 
approaches.  
How prevalent are these beliefs today? Yapko (1994) conducted a survey of over 850 
psychotherapists in private practice, which revealed unexpectedly high rates of endorsement of 
beliefs regarding hypnosis as a vehicle to enhance memory. Seventy-five percent of the 
therapists surveyed agreed “hypnosis enables people to accurately remember things they 
otherwise could not” (Yapko, 1994, p. 234).  Poole, Lindsay, Memon, and Bull (1995) reported 
comparable rates in an extensive survey of licensed clinical psychologists in the United States 
and Great Britain, revealing that therapy aimed at recovering memories was widespread.  Later, 
Legault and Laurence (2007) replicated these findings in a sample of more than 200 
psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers in Canada.  Most recently, Ost, Wright, Easton 
Hope and French  (2013), surveyed psychologists and hypno-therapists in the UK on repressed 
memories and satanic abuse and concluded:  “The results of this survey indicate that, despite 
the extensive literature that has developed in the last 20 years, a number of psychological 
therapists hold beliefs that many memory scientists would view as controversial, in short, 
beliefs about memory which fail to be supported by scientific data” (p.16). 
Similar beliefs about hypnosis and memory are held by laypersons. For example, 
Whitehouse, Orne, Orne, and Dinges (1991) reported that 93% of college-age participants 
believed that hypnosis enhances memory retrieval. Johnson and Hauck (1999) found that 88% 
of the respondents agreed to some degree that "hypnosis enables people to accurately remember 
things they could not otherwise remember (p.17)." Most recently, Green, Page, Rasekhy, 
Johnson, and Bernhardt (2006) sampled college students' beliefs about hypnosis in four 
countries (Australia, German, Iran, U. S.) and reported no cross-cultural differences in response 
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to the latter statement about hypnosis and memory, but fully 90% of participants, on average, 
agreed with it. 
The influence of beliefs and expectations on memory with or without hypnosis has 
important clinical and legal ramifications.  Belief about memory shapes not only personal 
memory in hypnosis, but also waking memory reports (Mazzoni, et al., 2010; Mazzoni, Clark 
and Nash, 2014) to the point of creating new identities (Cox and Barnier, 2013).  Clinicians 
surveyed by Legault and Laurence (2007) reported that 17.5 % of women entering therapy 
without actual memories of abuse ‘recovered’ those memories during therapy whether hypnosis 
was used or not (Laurence and Freedman, 2009). Therapists who reported making use of many 
‘recovery” techniques (including hypnosis) were the ones who reported a greater number of 
recovered memories.  The interplay of beliefs, expectancies, and recall of life narratives is still 
an open field in need of investigation.  The transmission of false beliefs (and expectations) and 
their potential consequences is a crucial aspect of our understanding of memory in action.  
Does hypnosis improve memory? Empirical evidence 
Is the belief that hypnosis enhances recall confirmed by the scientific literature? 
Although some studies have indeed found evidence for hypnotic hypermnesia, better-controlled 
studies have revealed how inaccurate memory reports can be in hypnosis. Crucially, these 
studies contributed to the shift in focus of memory research away from the sheer quantity of 
recollections towards the quality of memory reports. For decades, researchers (for example, 
Gordon Bower, Fergus Craik, Robert Lockhart, Endel Tulving, to name a few) had assessed 
memory in terms of how many items participants remembered, and on this basis established the 
effectiveness of encoding and retrieval conditions. Little attention was devoted to memory 
accuracy and the errors of memory (Koriat, Goldsmith and Pansky, 2000). But we now know 
that suggestions in hypnosis (see Labelle, Laurence, Nadon and Perry, 1990; Green, Lynn and 
Malinovski, 1998), as well as other types of suggestion (Mazzoni and Memon, 2003), including 
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misinformation, can modify recall and recognition in predictable directions (Cox and Barnier, 
2013; for a review see Mazzoni and Lynn, 2007; Mazzoni and Scoboria, 2007) and engender 
complex false memories (Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz and Lynn, 1999).  
Hypnotic Hypermnesia 
 Since the early 1970s, researchers have investigated normal (waking) hypermnesia and 
reminiscences (higher cumulative recall over time).  In laboratory investigations of hypnosis 
and memory the material-to-be-recalled may refer either to autobiographical events--sometimes 
from the person’s remote past--or to non-autobiographical material, such as filmed scenes, 
spoken stories, and word lists.   
Age regression is one of the methods of choice to uncover otherwise “forgotten” 
memories.  In age regression participants, including patients, are asked to “go back in time” and 
“relive” some past event. Sometimes, notably in the clinical setting, regression can involve 
highly implausible memories in the womb and even earlier reports of a purported past life. For 
many people, the experience of regression can be profound, vivid, and compelling. True (1949) 
claimed that when participants were age regressed, they successfully named the day of the 
week of childhood birthdays.  Yet better-controlled studies failed to replicate these findings (for 
a summary of this research see Nash, 1987). In fact, convincing evidence is lacking that 
participants in any real psychological or physical sense regress to an earlier stage of 
development or that memories retrieved following regression are uniquely or specifically 
accurate. As early as 1951, Martin Orne alerted the scientific community about the intrusions of 
confabulations in hypnotically age-regressed individuals. Confronted with the fact that the 
historical veracity of a past life, memories of life in the womb, or an early childhood memory 
can rarely be independently corroborated, researchers turned to experimental designs to control 
for the memory source and better evaluate the potential influences of hypnosis on memory. 
In a review of laboratory studies and accounts of forensic cases in which hypnosis has 
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been used to enhance eyewitness recall, Relinger (1984) concluded that hypnosis is more likely 
to facilitate the free recall of meaningful material (e.g., live or filmed scenes such as simulated 
crimes) than material such as word lists or nonsense syllables.  Researchers then sought to 
evaluate Relinger’s conclusion. As Erdelyi (1994) has shown convincingly, when studies are 
divided according to type of memory tests (recall versus recognition) and types of stimuli used 
(meaningless versus meaningful), it becomes much easier to evaluate  any hypermnesic effect 
of hypnosis on memory.  Examining studies that have targeted recognition, the answer is clear: 
There is no hypnotic hypermnesia in recognition, whether it is with meaningful or meaningless 
material (e.g., Zelig and Beidleman, 1981).   
In studies that have measured recall of meaningless (e.g., nonsense syllables) versus 
meaningful material (e.g., films extracts, meaningful pictures), the outcome is also clear: There 
is no hypermnesia for meaningless stimuli (see for example, Salzberg and DePiano, 1980).  
Nevertheless, for meaningful stimuli, a majority of studies did report a hypnotic hypermnesic 
effect above and beyond normal recall (e.g., Stager and Lundy, 1985).  Consistent with 
Relinger’s (1984) review, Erdelyi (1994) concluded that hypnotic hypermnesia is evident for 
the free recall of “high sense” material (e.g., poetry, pictures, films) as opposed to, say, 
recognition memory for lists of words or syllables.  
         But there is a caveat. Most studies reviewed by Relinger (1984) and Erdelyi (1994) that 
reported a positive hypermnesia effect did not take into account the fact that simply asking 
participants to repeat the retrieval leads to a normal increase in recall.  The studies that have 
used a typical ‘waking hypermnesia design’ in which participants’ recall is brought to plateau, 
before any hypermnesic technique is used, produced mixed results, favoring mostly an absence 
of a hypermnesic effect or a very small, unreliable one (e.g., Dinges, Whitehouse, Orne, 
Powell, Orne, and Erdelyi, 1992; Nogrady, McConkey and Perry, 1985). For example, Dywan 
and Bowers (1983) determined that a twofold increase in the number of accurate items reported 
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when memories were elicited in hypnosis was more than offset by a threefold increase in the 
number of errors compared with the error rate in nonhypnotic controls (see also Dinges et al., 
1992; Whitehouse, Dinges, Orne, and Orne, 1988 for similar results). In their meta-analysis of 
24 forensically relevant studies, Steblay and Bothwell (1994) concluded that, relative to waking 
conditions, hypnosis produced overall more recall errors, more intrusions of uncued errors, and 
higher levels of memories for false information relative to nonhypnotic methods.   In short, 
research points at best to an ephemeral hypermnesic effect: “now you see it, now you don’t.”  
At worst, we will see that hypnotically enhanced recall poses risks of false memory creation. 
Moreover, the increased recall following a hypermnesia suggestion during hypnosis may reflect 
nothing more than normal (nonhypnotic) hypermnesia (Erdelyi, 1994).  
 Memory enhancement or memory creation? 
Contrary to the lay view that memory accurately portrays experienced events, 
contemporary cognitive scientists agree that memory is a fallible and pliable construction, 
strongly influenced by current beliefs, feelings, expectations, images, and guesses about past 
events (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Loftus, 2003; Mazzoni and Kirsch, 2002). Most 
researchers concur that even the most ordinary memories are a composite of accurate and 
inaccurate recollections.  
In this light, it comes as no surprise that suggestive procedures--hypnosis being just one 
of them—can distort the content of recollections. The possibility of creating false memories in 
hypnosis was identified as early as the late 19th century. In a now-classic demonstration, 
Bernheim (1891/1973) suggested a false event to a patient (i.e., that she had gone to the 
bathroom four times, and on her last visit she had fallen and hit her nose). The patient 
remembered the suggested event and reported using the bathroom, explaining that it was 
because of diarrhea, and mentioned falling on the fourth visit and hitting her nose. After 
hypnosis, Bernheim apparently could not shake her belief in the memory.  
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In line with Bernheim’s findings, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, a burgeoning 
number of reports of suggestion-induced memory distortions emerged (M. T. Orne, 1979). 
Laurence and Perry (1983) provided one of the most dramatic empirical demonstrations of false 
memory in hypnosis. In their study, while hypnotized, highly hypnotisable participants were 
regressed to a night of the previous week and received the suggestion that a loud noise 
awakened them. If they reported having heard the suggested noise, they were asked to describe 
it in detail. Sixty-three percent of the participants accepted the suggestion and reported hearing 
the noise. Of these, 76% subsequently developed false memories of the noise. Confronted one 
week later with the actual recording of the session, all participants maintained their beliefs that 
the memory was genuine.  
Very early memory reports are also vulnerable to suggestive influences through 
hypnosis and a variety of other suggestive procedures (e.g., dream interpretation: Mazzoni et 
al., 1999; imagery: Mazzoni and Memon, 2003). For example, Malinoski, Lynn, and Sivec 
(1998) interviewed 40 hypnotized and 40 nonhypnotized participants about their earliest 
memories. The first time participants were asked to report their earliest memory, only 3% of 
the nonhypnotized participants recalled a memory earlier than 2 years, a finding that contrasts 
with the 23% of hypnotized participants who reported a memory earlier than age 2 (and 20% 
earlier than 18 months). After the second interview, only 8% of nonhypnotized participants 
reported a memory earlier than 2 years, whereas 35% of hypnotized participants reported 
memories earlier than 18 months (30% earlier than a year).  
Expectancy, criterion shift, and increased confidence. 
More recent work is aimed at understanding whether expectancy and warnings 
moderate the effect of hypnosis on memory.  Burgess and Kirsch (1999) found that when the 
suggestion contained warnings about the creation of false memories in hypnosis, fewer 
inaccurate memories were reported after hypnosis. Nevertheless, the effect of the warning 
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during hypnosis was minimal.  Notably, in no instance did hypnotic induction produce an 
increase in memory accuracy compared with performance in controls. 
In another study, warnings minimized memory distortions during but not after hypnosis 
(Green et al., 1998). However, Bryant and Barnier (1999) partly confirmed the Burgess and 
Kirsch (1999) findings by showing that highly hypnotizable participants retracted memories 
retrieved after a suggestion only when they were not hypnotized. Accordingly, the expectancy 
for memory enhancement in hypnosis is not easy to challenge, and highly hypnotizable 
individuals often maintain their belief in created memories. 
So far, the evidence reviewed implies that increases in correct responses are generally 
offset by increases in incorrect responding, leaving accuracy unchanged, or at times decreased. 
Nevertheless, the most frequently reported problem with hypnotically assisted recall is that 
during or after hypnosis, witnesses may erroneously report items that they would normally 
reject on the basis of uncertainty (see, for example, Krass, Kinoshita, and McConkey, 1989; 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, and Milling, 2002). The observed increase in incorrect responses 
has been most often explained by a lowering of participants’ criterion shift (Dinges et al., 1992; 
Erdelyi, 1994). A number of these studies, however, have shown that hypnosis is associated 
with enhanced confidence in responses, regardless of whether they are correct or erroneous and 
that hypnotizability moderates the effect.  This increase in confidence has been clearly 
documented in a study in which participants received misleading questions in and out of 
hypnosis (Scoboria, Mazzoni and Kirsch, 2008). When asked in hypnosis to rate confidence in 
the correctness of their memories, the more highly hypnotizable individuals’ confidence ratings 
were inflated, relative to confidence expressed without hypnosis.  
For a memory researcher, the observed increase in confidence ratings following multi-
trial recalls is somewhat surprising, and at odds with the usual interpretation of a lowered 
criterion shift leading to a hypermnesic effect.  As suggested by Dywan (1995), one would 
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expect the new items retrieved to be held with less confidence if they were the result of a lower 
criterion shift. As Dywan (1995) proposed, hypnosis may create an illusion of remembering 
that leads to a misattributional report.  Consistent with other studies on the creation of false 
memories and consistent with the attributional theories of memory (Whittlesea and Williams, 
2001a, 2001b, Mazzoni and Kirsch, 2002), visual imagination and source monitoring might 
play a major role (Mazzoni and Memon, 2003) as visual mental images with specific 
perceptual-like qualities can be mistaken for memories. Visual images convey a sense of 
recollection that mimics that of true memories (Mazzoni and Memon, 2003). Whether it be 
through the use of imagery, perceptual fluency, or the feelings of involuntariness of responses 
that often accompany hypnosis, the end-result may be that the ‘new” memories are quite 
similar to the ‘old’ ones, at least experientially (Laurence, Day and Gaston, 1998).  The 
experience of remembering in these cases has changed, and a criterion shift might not be 
necessary to explain memory enhancement (Dywan, 1998).  This illusion of remembering may 
lead a hypnotized person to believe that his or her recall has improved, even though some or 
most of what is recalled is incorrect. Inflated confidence in hypnotically-enhanced eyewitness 
memories is one of the issues that led the courts to rule that hypnosis is inadmissible, based on 
the presumption that jurors would be compelled by confidently held testimony. In conclusion, 
there is little theoretical or empirical justification for using hypnosis to enhance memory.  
 Hypnosis and Functional Disorders of Memory 
Memory is at the core of our identity, social relationships, and ability to plan for the 
future based on past experiences.  Not surprisingly, when memory is impaired, it creates 
difficulties across many areas of human functioning.  Functional amnesia is arguably one of the 
most compelling and controversial forms of forgetting, whether seen in a clinical or a forensic 
context, because it involves an apparently sudden memory loss typically associated with 
psychological trauma, rather than with brain damage or disease (McNally, 2003).  Functional 
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amnesia involves three major features: (1) a subjectively compelling apparent inability to 
consciously access autobiographical memories and information (i.e., disrupted explicit 
memory), (2) a continuing influence of the “forgotten” information on behavior, thought, and 
action (i.e., a dissociation between implicit and explicit memory), and (3) reversibility of the 
effect (see Cox and Barnier, 2003).  Functional amnesia is a major feature of the poorly 
understood, and often dramatic, psychological disorders of dissociative fugue, dissociative 
amnesia, and dissociative identity disorder (Giesbrecht, Lynn, Lilienfeld, et al., 2008), and has, 
for the past three decades, figured prominently in controversies about repressed and recovered 
memories (Erdelyi, 2006).         
 Functional amnesia is particularly interesting because it: (1) appears to eliminate 
detailed and complex autobiographical memories for a substantial period of time;  (2) the 
forgetting seems involuntary, unlike a great deal of everyday forgetting where effort is required 
to suppress upsetting memories; and (3) it resolves spontaneously and often dramatically.  
Accordingly, functional amnesia goes to the heart of theoretical and applied questions about 
malingering, memory accessibility, and the relation between cognition and emotion.  However, 
the spontaneous, transient, and complex nature of functional amnesia has limited its systematic 
investigation, making laboratory analogs of the phenomenon appealing.  
In PHA, the hypnotist suggests that following hypnosis a person will be unable to recall 
material (traditionally stimuli learned or events experienced during hypnosis but extending also 
to experiences before hypnosis) until they receive a reversibility cue.  Typically, for high but 
not low hypnotizable individuals, PHA leads to disrupted explicit memory, discrepancies 
between implicit and explicit memory, and reversibility when the hypnotist provides a cue to 
the participant, such as “Now you can remember everything” (Barnier, 2002).  Researchers 
have documented PHA for items learned or experienced during hypnosis, such as word lists 
(e.g., Kihlstrom, 1980), for information learned prior to hypnosis (for e.g., Barnier, Bryant, 
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Briscoe, 2001), and even for past personal experiences (e.g., Barnier, 2002).   
The similarities between functional amnesia and PHA (i.e., impaired explicit memory, a 
dissociation between explicit and implicit memory, and reversibility) have spurred researchers 
to use PHA as a laboratory paradigm to model and explore disorders of personal memory.  For 
example,, Barnier and her colleagues (Barnier, 2002; Cox and Barnier, 2003) and other 
investigators (Mendelsohn, Chalamish, Solomonovich, and Dudai, 2007) have argued that 
posthypnotic amnesia (PHA) can be used to model functional amnesia.  Barnier has conducted 
programmatic research on PHA as a model of functional amnesia.  Her research has focused on 
personal, emotional everyday life events, in contrast with much previous research that focused 
on simple material or less meaningful experiences such as word lists and the events of hypnosis 
(e.g., Kihlstrom and Evans, 1976; Spanos, Radtke, and Dubreuil, 1982).  For example, Barnier 
(2002) asked high and low hypnotizable participants to recall a memory from their first day at 
high school and their first day at university.  Following a hypnotic induction, she provided half 
of the participants with a PHA suggestion for their first day at high school and the remainder of 
participants with a parallel suggestion to forget their first day at university.  Before she 
administered the reversibility cue to cancel PHA, she assessed, by way of category generation 
and social judgment tasks, participants’ implicit memory for the events and probed for their 
explicit recall of the events a second time.  Barnier found a dissociation between explicit and 
implicit measures for high hypnotizable individuals, but not for low hypnotizable individuals.  
For highs, their explicit recall returned to the unimpaired baseline level of lows’ recall 
following the reversibility cue.  Accordingly, her research provided a useful method for 
investigating temporary and reversible forgetting of autobiographical memories.   
As Cox and Bryant (2008) noted, Cox and Barnier's (2003) research provides a useful 
technique for examining shifts in memory accessibility, allowing comparisons with clinical 
disorders of memory, including dissociative identity disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder 
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where intrusive memories of trauma are often suppressed (Brewin, 2001). During hypnosis, 
Cox and Barnier (2003) first invited high and low hypnotizable participants to recall memories 
of a first romantic relationship in response to 10 cue phrases.  They then administered a PHA 
suggestion that targeted either the entire period or specific memories from that period. After 
PHA was administered, and again after the PHA suggestion was cancelled, explicit memory 
was assessed by cued recall (5 cue phrases that had been presented at elicitation/“old cues”) 
and five “new cues” that had not been presented previously.   Interestingly, PHA had the 
greatest impact on high hypnotizable, but not low hypnotizable individuals’ recall (forgetting of 
“old cues”) when the suggestion targeted the entire period rather than specific events.   
Moreover, high hypnotizable individuals exhibited dissociation between explicit and implicit 
memories, as indexed by a social judgment task.   The authors argued that the pattern of results 
was consistent with predictions derived from Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model of 
autobiographical memory, which holds that autobiographical memory is organized in terms of 
three interconnected levels: lifetime periods measured in months, years, decades; general 
events (e.g., days, weeks, months); and event-specific knowledge.  A more global suggestion to 
forget a particular period would be expected to be particularly effective in that it would target 
all memories in a particular period and tag related memories in the period with the goal to not 
remember.  Accordingly, the finding that the PHA suggestion that targeted the entire period had 
a greater impact on recall performance than the PHA suggestion that targeted specific events is 
consistent with Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s model.     
 In a fascinating recent study, Mendelsohn and his colleagues (Mendelsohn, et al., 2007) 
used fMRI to investigate the effects of suggestions for PHA on brain activity associated with 
real-life episodic memories of a viewed film and the context in which the film was viewed.   
The study compared high hypnotizable participants who were able to experience PHA with 
high hypnotizable participants who were unable to experience PHA. A week after participants 
 14 
viewed a documentary movie depicting a routine day in the life of a young Israeli woman, the 
researchers administered a hypnotic induction in the fMRI scanner followed by PHA 
suggestions to forget the movie details until they received a reversal cue.   Participants were 
tested while performing a computerized retrieval test and scanned twice for their recall of the 
movie and the context (e.g., during the movie, the door to the room was closed); first after 
hypnosis was terminated and while they experienced the posthypnotic suggestion, and second, 
following the cancellation of the suggestion.        
 The researchers found that people in the PHA group (who could experience PHA) 
forgot many more details from the movie than people in the non-PHA group (who could not 
experience PHA).  After the suggestion was cancelled, recall across groups was equivalent and 
memory loss reversed.  PHA memory loss was highly selective: memories for the context were 
preserved for people in the PHA group, despite reports of impaired memories for the movie.  
Importantly, the researchers found that activity in occipital, temporal, and prefrontal areas of 
the brain differed among the groups, and, in the PHA group, between suggestion and reversal 
conditions.  They argued that the brain activation seen in PHA reflects a dampening—some 
form of rapid, early inhibition of memory—due to increased activity in the prefrontal cortex 
(Barnier, Cox, and Savage, 2008).  Although the findings reviewed are based on an analog of 
functional memory impairments, they point researchers in interesting directions and beg the 
question of how findings derived from analog studies differ from studies of patients with 
functional amnesia.           
 Hypnotic suggestions can also be used to model fundamental alterations in identity as 
core to one’s personality as identification of the self as a man or woman. Burn, Barnier, and 
McConkey (2001) selected very high and highly hypnotizable participants and suggested 
during hypnosis that they would become more and more like the opposite sex in many ways.  
Most of the very high hypnotizable participants and many of the highly hypnotizable 
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participants responded positively to this rather surprising suggestion. Participants then heard 
two stories, one about a male individual and one about a female. Participants remembered more 
of the story consistent with their suggested sex change. Even confronted with contradictory 
information, most of the participants maintained their delusional response.  Postexperimental 
inquiries revealed that these participants modified their information processing and selectively 
attended to the story consistent with their sex change, perceiving the story as more self 
referential and personally meaningful.        
 Cox and Barnier (2013) examined the relation between a suggested self-identity 
delusion and the availability of autobiographical memories.  The researchers provided 
participants with the suggestion that they would become more and more like one of their 
siblings (or a new non-existing sibling).  Highly hypnotizable participants produced more 
specific memories in line with their new identity, with memories rich in sensory-perceptual 
details that often represented a reinterpretation of previous experiences and served to bolster 
the reality of the suggested delusion. The findings supported Conway’s (1996) self-memory 
system hypothesis, which predicts that shifts of identity should lead to a corresponding shift in 
the availability of autobiographical memories.  
 In a series of studies aimed at creating laboratory analogues of actual delusional beliefs 
(e.g., mirror self-misidentification, delusion of alien control), Barnier and her colleagues 
(Barnier et al., 2008; Cox and Barnier, 2010) have shown convincingly that hypnotically 
suggested delusions can help us understand the social and cognitive factors involved in these 
delusions and ultimately provide interesting clues as to how they can be eliminated or treated. 
These experiments also underscore the role that autobiographical memory plays in the 
maintenance of these disorders.   
Hypnosis can also play an important role in the investigation of mood, autobiographical 
memory, and self-identity. Some researchers (e.g. Maccalum, McConkey, Bryant, Barnier, 
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2000) have shown that specific moods induced during hypnosis affect the type of 
autobiographical memories reported in response to positive (happy), negative (sad), and neutral 
cues. More specifically, whereas low hypnotizables were not affected by the mood inductions, 
highs responded differently to the different cues in the sad condition. Asked to retrieve specific 
personal memories for each cue provided by the experimenter (for example smile or angry), 
highs had less access to specific positive memories while in a sad mood.  This finding is 
consistent with previous research indicating that individuals experience more difficulty 
retrieving positive memories when depressed (Goddard, Dritschel, and Burton, 1996).  In this 
case, hypnosis helped researchers understand the relation between the valence of the emotional 
state and memory output, and indicates that hypnotic mood induction can be a useful procedure 
to examine the relation between mood and autobiographical memory.  Combined, the studies 
reviewed imply that hypnotically elicited delusions can affect information processing and may 
prove to be highly relevant to understanding potential links between delusional beliefs and 
autobiographical memory, as well as the subjective experiences of individuals who suffer from 
delusions. 
One can extrapolate that hypnosis may in the future provide a means to restructure 
personal identity by reshaping memories. Although in clinical practice hypnosis has been used 
from time to time during the past two centuries to create punctual positive personal pseudo-
memories, little empirical work has been done to date in assessing the use of hypnotic 
suggestions to create a network of pseudo-memories to shape a positive and functional self-
identity.  
 Posthypnotic amnesia and intentional forgetting 
 In addition to providing a valuable analog of functional memory disorders, posthypnotic 
amnesia may facilitate our understanding of intentional and more seemingly automatic 
forgetting.  PHA appears to be associated with a breakdown of normal retrieval strategies 
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(Kihlstrom and Evans, 1971).  Evidence for this breakdown derives from the apparent lack of 
structure (serial recall, recall in clusters) in the material that participants recall (Kihlstrom and 
Wilson, 1984; Spanos, MacLean, and Bertrand, 1986; Coe, 1989). Whether the disrupted 
retrieval is (a) the product of response strategies that participants adopt when instructed to 
forget information they would normally retain in memory (e.g. Spanos, 1986), or (b) the 
consequence of a breakdown in the subject’s executive functions, is still open to investigation.  
Suggested amnesia may be highly selective (e.g., for particular semantic categories in a 
word list or a specific memory) or extensive, representing a “blanket” amnesia. For example, 
the last item of Form C of the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer 
&  Hilgard, 1962) is the suggestion is to forget everything that happened during the hypnotic 
session. Amnestic responses can be examined in terms of social demands (extrinsic factors) and 
the individuals’ cognitive, affective, and neurophysiological makeup.   
Two major forms of intentional forgetting are directed forgetting (DF) (e.g.,  Basden, 
Basden and Gargano, 1993) and intentional suppression of memories such as in the Think-
NoThink procedure (Anderson and Green, 2001). Few studies have compared DF with 
forgetting elicited by hypnotic suggestion.  So far, results have been mixed, indicating some 
common, although not identical, retrieval inhibition process. In the most recent study, David, 
Brown, Pojoga, and David (2000) concluded that both DF and PHA could implicate different 
cognitive mechanisms or share some similarities through retrieval inhibition. One of the main 
difficulties in comparing DF and PHA is in equating the instructions to forget. In the list-
method DF, participants are told following the presentation of the first list that it was a practice 
run and they can ignore the list, and that the next list presented is the one to remember. 
Hypnotized participants, on the other hand, are told that they will forget the first list until the 
amnesic-release cue is provided.  From the participants’ perspective, these two sets of 
instructions may be perceived as disparate memory tasks and, in fact, convey very different 
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task demands.  
 Accordingly, some studies comparing DF with PHA procedures have obtained 
differences in performance (Kilhstrom, 1983). Compared with DF, PHA produced greater 
amnesia (fewer items are recalled), and the reversal cue triggered the return of most memories 
(in high hypnotizable individuals). In contrast, the DF effect was much weaker, both for 
forgetting and for re-accessing memories when the reversal cue was presented (Basden, 
Basden, Coe, Decker, and Crutcher, 1994). Until the contexts can be equated it will be difficult 
to investigate the role that hypnosis, hypnotizability, or amnesia play in a DF framework. 
Nonetheless, these studies reveal the intriguing possibility that at least in high hypnotizable 
individuals there may be a forgetting mechanism that has eluded DF researchers and is worth 
pursuing.   
Voluntary suppression, exemplified by the Think-NoThink task, represents another 
interesting arena of investigation where the use of hypnosis and PHA could further knowledge 
of the mechanisms involved in voluntarily attempting to not think about something.  The 
typical intentional suppression procedure (Anderson and Green, 2001) is a retrieval induced 
forgetting task that induces a non-intentional form of memory inhibition. In a cued-recall task, 
participants learn a list of word pairs (cue-target) to a certain (usually high) criterion. A subset 
of the target words is then tagged for ‘forgetting’ (F), whereas the majority of words are tagged 
for ‘remember’ (R), and still other words (baseline targets) are not re-presented during this 
phase. During the Think-NoThink phase, cues for the R and for the F words are presented, and 
participants are asked either to remember the targets (R targets) or “not to think” about the 
corresponding targets (F targets). Instructions for the Not thinking condition request that 
participants make their minds “blank.”  This task is reminiscent of Wegner’s (1989) ironic 
effects paradigm.  When individuals are asked to voluntarily not think about something, it often 
triggers the paradoxical emergence of the ‘forbidden’ word or thought. Bowers and Woody 
 19 
(1996) examined the potential ironic effects of voluntarily suppressing a specific thought in 
high and low hypnotizable individuals, in and out of hypnosis, with and without suggested 
PHA.  Of all the different groups tested, only high hypnotizables, hypnotized participants who 
received a PHA suggestion aimed at suppressing the thought showed a significant decrease in 
number of intrusions.  
Although no published studies to date have compared performance in PHA with 
intentional suppression, as measured by the Think-NoThink task, the results of a series of 
unpublished studies by the first author indicate that highly hypnotizable individuals are better at 
inhibiting target words in this latter task, compared with medium and low hypnotizable 
participants. The suppression effect was obtained without hypnosis, implying that the hypnotic 
induction is not necessary to produce forgetting due to inhibition. These studies illustrate well 
how hypnosis, hypnotizability, and specifically PHA can inform memory research and suggest 
new areas of investigation that may not be readily amenable to study with traditional methods 
of directed forgetting. 
In the Mendelson et al. (2008) study referred to earlier, the authors contended that the 
simultaneous lifting of the amnesia and the restoration of brain activity in regions crucial to 
retrieval strongly imply that memory suppression occurred at early stages of the retrieval 
process. The researchers remarked that the amnesia produced by the posthypnotic suggestion 
“affects an executive pre-retrieval monitoring process, which produces an early decision on 
whether to proceed or not on retrieval, and in case of a [question about the movie], aborts the 
process” (p. 165).  Is this executive pre-retrieval monitoring process at play in intentional 
suppression? Is this process responsible for the difference in retrieval inhibition found when DF 
and PHA are compared?  It is likely that studies similar to the Mendelson et al. (2008) could 
assist in understanding the cognitive processes involved in DF, PHA, and intentional inhibition.  
Memory accuracy 
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Although researchers have demonstrated that hypnosis should not be used to facilitate 
recall, some researchers have investigated whether hypnosis could be used to improve memory 
accuracy. Wagstaff, Cole, Wheatcroft, Anderton and Madden (2008) evaluated the possibility 
that suggestions provided in hypnosis might attenuate (rather than increase) the misinformation 
effect and false memories. The study was based on the rationale that expectancies and demand 
characteristics established by suggestions are responsible for the increase in false memories and 
confidence that is typically observed during and after hypnosis. Nevertheless, expectancies and 
demand characteristics can be manipulated with the goal of reducing false memories. When the 
researchers informed participants that they could discriminate correct and incorrect to-be-
recalled items during hypnosis, the typical misinformation and inflated confidence effects were 
not evident.  
In a similar vein, Oeberst and Blank (2012) have shown that the misinformation effect 
can be completely reversed through what the authors call an “enlightenment” procedure, in 
which the researchers ask participants to search for two contradictory items in memory, rather 
than for the typically single “correct” answer.  This procedure apparently enhances source 
monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay, 1993) by testing separately the contribution to 
the final memory of what is remembered about the items and what is remembered about the 
source of the item. The Wagstaff et al. (2008) and Oerst and Blank (2012) studies raise the 
intriguing possibility that hypnosis might produce a change in the way participants interpret the 
memory task, enhance comparison of what is remembered and from what source, and facilitate 
which mental contents are reported among the various mental contents activated.  
Accordingly, hypnosis holds potential to enhance the metacognitive monitoring system, 
which is responsible during retrieval for assessing the source and adequacy of memories  
(Koriat et al., 2000; Mazzoni and Hanczakowski, 2011; Johnson et al., 1993). Suggestions 
might be phrased to enhance scrutiny of material retrieved and to direct participants’ attention 
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specifically towards memory characteristics (for e.g., sensory details, self-referentials) that 
research on source monitoring has shown to discriminate true and false memories, 
hypothetically engendering more successful monitoring of accurate memories and rejection of 
false memories. The possibility of using hypnosis to discriminate true and false memories 
would not only represent a major contribution to memory research, but also would represent a 
welcome development in the forensic and clinical domains (see for example Wagstaff, 
Wheatcroft, Burt, Pilkington, Wilkinson, and Hoyle, 2011). 
Involuntary autobiographical memories 
Involuntary autobiographical memories ‘pop up’ in everyday life during undemanding 
monotonous tasks, with no intention or directive to retrieve them (Berntsen, Staugaard, and 
Sorensen, 2013; see Vannucci, Mazzoni, and Batool in press). One of the markers of these 
memories is the feeling of involuntariness, which people also often experience when retrieval 
occurs in hypnosis. A potentially productive line of research would be to address the frequency 
and comparability of memories that emerge on a seemingly involuntary basis in hypnotic and 
nonhypnotic contexts and to explore the extent to which similar or different resting state 
conditions characterize retrieval of hypnotic and awake involuntary memories.  Recent studies 
have shown that hypnosis activates anterior default mode areas in the brain (e.g. McGeown, 
Mazzoni, Venneri, & Kirsch, 2009), and the retrieval of involuntary memories seems to be 
facilitated during mind wandering states in which the default mode is also active (Vannucci et 
al, in press; for a review on mind wandering see Schooler, Smallwood, Christoff, Handy, 
Reichle, et al., 2011). The recent development of new methodologies that elicit involuntary 
memories in the laboratory (see Schlagman and Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci et al, in press; 
Berntsen et al., 2013) imply that future studies in this area might provide insight into the nature 
of involuntary memory retrieval.  
Prospective memory? 
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It is intriguing to contemplate that posthypnotic suggestion (PHS) could be considered a 
form of prospective memory (Einstein and McDaniel, 1996), which is the type of memory that 
makes it possible for us to remember what to do in the future (e.g. ask a question or take a pill 
at a certain pre-defined time during the day). People seemingly set up their own cues as 
reminders for the time and place where a particular action is to occur. PHS is a suggestion 
given during hypnosis to take place after hypnosis is terminated. It is conceived as a way to 
remember to do something at a certain time; that is, when a cue is presented. How do people 
remember to open a window when they do not remember the instructions (given in hypnosis) 
but do so at the specified time or in the specified context? How do people set up the cues that 
will serve as reminders to perform the action? It would be quite interesting to use PHS as a 
method to study prospective memory.   These are questions that can animate research for some 
years to come. 
Concluding remarks 
We have proffered but a few ideas regarding how hypnosis can be used to further our 
knowledge of memory. We foresee a productive interaction between hypnosis and memory 
research. Hypnosis represents an excellent model for understanding social, cognitive, and 
neurological processes involved in remembering and forgetting personal events,. More 
specifically, hypnosis provides a fruitful methodology to model memory disorders and their 
relation to self-identity, a welcome venue to differentiate voluntary from involuntary 
forgetting, and a broad and fertile field in the investigation of memories in everyday life.  
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